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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dustin L. James appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedinqs 
Police officers made a traffic stop of a vehicle that contained multiple 
passengers. (10118/05 Tr., p.2, L.20 - p.3, L.13.) After the owner of the vehicle 
consented to a search of the vehicle, the passengers got out of the vehicle and 
the vehicle was searched. (10118/05 Tr., p.3, L.10 - p.4, L.1.) The search 
revealed a pipe and a bag of methamphetamine. (10/18105 Tr., p.4, L.2 - p.6, 
L.4.) The officer who located the drugs "advised [the group of individuals whom 
had been in the car] that [the officer] was going to place everybody in custody 
seems how [the drugs and pipe] w[ere] in the control of the car inside." 
(10118105 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-6.) James, who was a passenger in the vehicle, then 
"stated that it was his property." (10118105 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-23.) 
The state charged James with possession of a controlled substance. (R., 
p.14.) Before trial, James moved to suppress the admission of his statement 
that the drug pipe and methamphetamine were his. (R., pp.45-46.) After a 
hearing (R., p.47), the district court denied the motion in a written memorandum 
and order (R., pp.52-59). 
Subsequently, James pled guilty but preserved his right to appeal from the 
denial of the motion to suppress. (R., p.65.) The district court sentenced James 
to five years with two years fixed. (R., p.82.) However, the court suspended 
execution of the judgment and granted probation. (R., p.83.) James filed a 
timely notice of appeal.' 
James states that a motion to augment the record with the notice of appeal was 
filed contemporaneously with his brief. (Appellant's Brief, p.3, n.2.) The state 
does not have any record of the motion to augment actually being filed. 
Regardless, the notice of appeal is contained in the file folder. 
ISSUE 
James states the issue on appeal as follows: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. James's motion to 
suppress because he was subject to custodial interrogation in 
violation of Miranda? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has James failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress? More specifically: 
1. Has James failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that 
James was not in custody at the time he confessed to owning the 
drugs and paraphernalia? 
2. Even if James was in custody, has James failed to show that his 
confession was in response to an interrogation subsequent to his 
being in custody? 
ARGUMENT 
James Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
James argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress, claiming that at the time he confessed to ownership of the controlled 
substance "he was subject to custodial interrogation" in violation of Miranda. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1.) James's argument has no merit. James was not in 
custody at the time he informed the officer that he was the owner of the 
methamphetamine and pipe found in the vehicle. Furthermore, even if he was in 
custody, his confession was not made in response to police interrogation. 
6. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a motion to suppress is bifurcated. The 
appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. The appellate court freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 
1 167 (2000). 
C. James Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That 
James Was Not In Custodv At The Time He Confessed 
James argues he was entitled to Miranda warnings once the officer told 
the group that they were going to be placed in custody. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
James's claim misconstrues the law. Miranda is triggered when a person is 
subjected to custodial interrogation, not before. 
Miranda warnings must be given to a suspect who is subject to custodial 
interrogation. State v. Silva, 134 ldaho 848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). In California v. Beheler, 463 
U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983), the United States Supreme Court explained that 
"custody" for purposes of the Miranda requirement turns on whether there is a 
"formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with 
a formal arrest." This standard is an objective test: whether a reasonable 
person would believe he or she was in police custody to a degree associated 
with formal arrest, not whether the person would believe he or she was not free 
to leave. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). It is the defendant's 
burden to demonstrate that he was in custody. United States v. De La Fuente, 
548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Here, James claims that he met this burden, claiming he was in custody to 
a degree associated with formal arrest and entitled to be read his Miranda once 
the officer told the group that they were going to be placed in custody. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) James fails to apply the correct legal standard. 
The legal standard is not whether a reasonable person believes they will 
be put into custody to a degree associated with formal arrest, but rather whether 
a reasonable person believes they are presently in custody to a degree 
associated with formal arrest. See Silva, 134 ldaho at 854, 11 P.3d at 50. 
James only claims the latter, contending he was in custody because of Officer 
Sterling's statement. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) That statement was: "I advised 
[the group] that I was going to place everybody in custody." (10/18/05 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.3-5.) (emphasis added.) Because he was "going to" put them in custody it 
necessarily follows that, at that time, nobody was in custody, particularly to a 
degree associated with formal arrest. 
Indeed, even James admits in his brief that his feeling of "restraint" arose 
from his fear of the possibility of a future arrest due to the fact that the police 
officer had found his drugs and not from the fact that he was under arrest or 
presently in custody: "At that point, Mr. James had two options: I) he could say 
nothing, and be arrested; or 2) he could speak, and be arrested." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.7 (emphasis added to highlight his own understanding that he had not yet 
been arrested or placed in custody).) 
Accordingly, because James was not in custody to a degree analogous 
with formal arrest at the time he confessed, there is no basis for James's claim 
that he should have been informed of his Miranda rights. 
D. Even Assuminq That James Was In Custody. There Was No lnterroqation 
And, Therefore, No Miranda Violation 
Even if the officer's statement created a custodial situation, there was no 
subsequent interrogation. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda only apply to 
custodial "interrogations," i.e., "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a 
police dominated atmosphere." Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) 
(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966)). "Miranda warnings are not 
required unless there is both custody and interrogation." State v. Countrvman, 
572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997). Here, James has not identified any 
interrogation that occurred subsequent to the point he claims he was in custody. 
Indeed, James was not asked a single question after the point in time where he 
claims he was in custody. 
The independent nature of the interrogation requirement is reflected in 
State v. Rhoades, 119 ldaho 594, 601, 809 P.2d 455, 466 (1991). In Rhoades 
the defendant spontaneously said "I did it" while handcuffed and held against a 
car in the absence of any questioning. Id. The ldaho Supreme Court affirmed 
the denial of Rhoades's motion to suppress the statement. "Any statement given 
freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible 
in evidence . . . . Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth 
Amendment." Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). 
Even assuming that James was in custody, like Rhoades, there was no 
subsequent questioning or compelling influences by law enforcement. It is clear 
from the record that the reason James admitted ownership of the drugs was to 
save his friend from having his probation from being revoked: "Okay, if you are 
going to take Mr. Henage to jail, then, he's on probation, I don't want him to go to 
jail, so I will take responsibility." (10/18/25 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-7.) From the context of 
James's statement, it is clear that his confession was not made because of any 
questioning by law enforcement but because of the reality of the circumstance of 
drugs being found in the car and the consequence of that finding for a certain 
individual who was in that car. Thus. James's confession, like the "I did it" 
confession in Rhoades, was a volunteered statement unrelated to any 
questioning by law enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm James's conviction. 
DATED this 2nd day of January 2008 
Deputy Attorney General 
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